

Keeping or Losing Faith? Comparing Religion across Majority and Minority Youth in Europe

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10.1 Introduction

RELIGION IS AN IMPORTANT dimension of diversity in contemporary European societies. Traditionally a Christian continent—despite considerable country differences regarding the prevalence of (a) specific type(s) of Christianity—European societies today are among the most secularised in the world (Norris & Inglehart 2011). Yet the large-scale immigration through post-colonial ties, ‘guest-worker’ recruitment and refugee movements that occurred in all North-Western European countries has not only increased ethnic but also religious diversity in Europe (Castles & Miller 2009). In contrast to the USA, where both the religious background and average religiosity of migrants and non-migrants are more similar (Cadge & Ecklund 2007), immigrants and the majority population differ in both respects in Europe: a substantial share of immigrants are Muslims and have higher levels of religiosity than natives (Foner & Alba 2008; van Tubergen & Sindradottir 2011; Voas & Fleischmann 2012). This has turned religion, and particularly Islam, into a ‘bright boundary marker’ between immigrants and European natives (Alba 2005). High-impact events such as terrorist attacks by Islamist extremists as well as many societal debates about the accommodation of religious diversity across European societies (e.g. Bader 2007) have contributed to the widely held belief that religion hampers immigrant integration in Europe.

Against the background of growing concern in public debates and among policy-makers that religion would stand in the way of the integration of immigrants and their offspring into secular European societies, this chapter examines how religious youth in Europe are today. We compare majority and minority youth with regard to their religious affiliation and levels of religiosity, and we relate the latter to social conditions such as generational status, ethnicity and gender, and to core explanations including religious socialisation and education. So far, research

on the topic of immigrant religion has focused mostly on adults, many of whom belonged to the first generation, that is, they were born and socialised in migrant-sending countries with different religious backgrounds and often higher levels of religiosity (van Tubergen & Sindradottir 2011). Earlier studies have shown that Muslim immigrant families and communities in Europe generally tend to transmit their religiosity to the next generation (Güngör et al. 2011; Verkuyten et al. 2012; de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014), although there is also evidence for secularisation across generations and Muslim parents' limited influence when transmitting their religion to their children (Maliepaard & Lubbers 2013; van de Pol & van Tubergen 2014). In (mainstream) Christian families—both of migrant and non-migrant origin—the pattern of intergenerational religious decline is well known (Jacob & Kalter 2013). The latter finding in particular emphasises the need to study religion among European youth from a comparative perspective by including affiliates of different religious groups. While the focus on Muslim minorities in previous research on immigrant religion is understandable given the argument of Islam as a particularly bright boundary marker in European societies, a more inclusive approach to the study of religion among minority and majority youth that allows for a comparison across religious groups is needed for a comprehensive understanding of the importance of religion in the life of youth growing up in Europe today.

In addition, previous research typically focused on religious minority groups or immigrants only and therefore lacks a comparison with the native majority. As a consequence, it is so far unknown whether and to what extent youth from particular religious backgrounds stand out compared to other religious affiliations and native-origin youth in terms of their religiosity. Finally, only few studies have addressed the question whether immigrant religion varies across European countries (Connor 2010; van Tubergen & Sindradottir 2011; Fleischmann & Phalet 2012; van der Bracht et al. 2013; Torrekens & Jacobs 2016), despite our knowledge about important country differences in historical church–state relations and how they affected the accommodation of religious minority groups (e.g. Rath et al. 2001; Fetzer & Soper 2005).

This chapter therefore addresses the question of how religious minority and majority youth in Europe are today. We ask how many are affiliated to a religion, and if so, which one? How often do they pray and attend religious meetings? Is religion important to them or not? In answering these research questions, we thus touch multiple aspects of religion. According to Foner & Alba (2008), the lack of similarity between natives' and migrants' religious affiliation is the first reason why religion would work as a barrier to immigrant integration in Europe. The second reason they describe is the high level of religiosity among immigrants, which would contrast with low average levels of religiosity among European majority populations. This chapter therefore provides important comparative insights into one of the mostly debated aspects of integration. Next to describing and explaining levels of religiosity of majority and minority youth in Europe, which is the central aim of this chapter, its findings can also inform other research questions studied

in this comparative volume and research on immigrant integration in general. For instance, school segregation (discussed in Chapter 5) might contribute to the persistence of religious boundaries, as minority youth are less likely to be exposed to the secular norms of their majority peers in more segregated schools. Moreover, because religion is seen as a more or less coherent set of beliefs and values, many of which concern family and gender relations (Brinkerhoff & MacKie 1985), it is likely to shape youth's attitudes towards gender roles, homosexuality, marriage and cohabiting (see Chapter 12). Differences in these attitudes and values are often perceived as cultural threats, which is known to affect out-group prejudice (Stephan & Stephan 1996). To the extent that majority and minority youth differ in their religious affiliation and religiosity, this might also affect their likelihood to engage in positive social contact with each other and hold positive attitudes towards one another (see Chapters 7 and 8). These examples show the relevance of studying religion for understanding the integration of minority youth in Europe.

Before presenting the findings, Section 10.2 briefly sketches the religious contexts that youth encounter in the four countries under study and relates them to general expectations regarding religious change, stability or revival.

10.2 Contextual and Theoretical Background

10.2.1 Religious contexts of reception

Despite scholarly debates regarding the reasons for and universality of religious decline (Casanova 2003), the empirical finding that European societies have strongly secularised in the same period in which large-scale immigration occurred stands uncontested (Bruce 2011). In all North-Western European societies, population statistics and survey data reveal a pattern of declining rates of religious attendance and a growing share of non-affiliates (e.g. Burkimsher 2014). While secularisation is contested as a theory to account for religious change (Gorski & Altinordu 2008), it is firmly established as an empirical regularity in the North-Western European societies that are the focus of this comparative volume. From a global comparative perspective, England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden are located in the most secularised region in the world and have comparable levels of modernisation and educational expansion, which are considered core driving forces of secularisation (Berger 1967; Wilson 1982). We would therefore expect only minor differences in the levels of religiosity between England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.

Still, there are gradual differences between the four countries in their *levels of religiosity*. Concerning the share of affiliates, according to the data from the European Social Survey (2002–14, authors' calculations), Sweden and the Netherlands seem to be more strongly secularised than England and Germany. Over 60% of the population in the former two countries declare no religious affiliation, while the share of non-religious people gravitates towards 50% in England

and 40% in Germany. Keeping these differences in the share of religious persons in mind, the breakdown of affiliations is rather similar in the four countries, with 85% or more of all religious persons affiliated to Christianity.

Levels of religiosity among the general population in the four countries are also rather similar. In England, Germany and the Netherlands, 8–13% attend services weekly or more, 16–19% pray daily and 13–16% report a high level of religiosity (i.e. they score 8 or higher on the 1–10 scale of self-reported religiosity). In Sweden the corresponding percentages are rather low, with 4% for attendance and 8% for prayer and high religiosity. This quick glance at the data shows that in terms of religious contexts of immigrant reception, Sweden is the most secularised of the four comparison countries in light of the large share of non-affiliates as well as low levels of religiosity among the affiliated. The Netherlands, although similar to Sweden in terms of the share of non-affiliates, resembles England and Germany in terms of levels of religiosity. Overall, these three countries host a significant minority of actively religious persons, but the majority of the general population is not strongly involved with religion in all four countries under study.

In addition to the religiosity of the general population, the way in which religion is *regulated* by the state and to what extent religious minority rights are recognised is an important aspect of the religious context of reception that immigrants encounter. The four countries under study also differ in this respect. The Dutch history of religious pluralism and state neutrality—also referred to as ‘pillarisation’ (Lijphart 1968)—has provided many opportunities for religious minority groups to build their own religious institutions. The legacy of state churches as they were historically established in both England and Sweden has been argued to have facilitated the recognition of religious minority rights, because minorities could lobby for state recognition of their religious rights on the basis of equality principles in these countries, resulting in relatively advanced accommodation of religious minority rights (Fetzer & Soper 2005). Of the four countries under study, Germany is often described as the least favourable institutional context for religious minorities, particularly Muslims, because it has not systematically extended its system of state funding for religious activities to religious newcomers (Doomernik 1995).

The countries studied in this volume do not only constitute different religious contexts of reception for newcomers, they also host *different types of migrants*. In line with country-specific histories of migration (see Chapter 2), the ethnic and religious composition of the minority population differs between the four countries. For instance, ethnic minorities in Sweden more often arrived as refugees and, compared to labour and post-colonial migrants, are likely to experience more insecurity—both existential and economic—and might therefore be more religious than other migrants (Norris & Inglehart 2011).¹ Moreover, post-colonial migrants

¹ Religion provides people with absolute rules and assures that following these rules will help them guarantee a secure future in this world or the next. People who experience higher levels of existential and economic insecurities are more likely to feel stressed about their unpredictable future and have the need for the rules posed by religious ideologies (Norris & Inglehart 2011).

in Britain are often Muslims and therefore religious ‘others’ from the majority perspective, while post-colonial migrants in the Netherlands are predominantly Christian and therefore resemble the native majority more. We will address these differences by presenting country-specific findings and by examining individual religiosity as a function of immigrant generation and origin country.

10.2.2 Religious change?

Previous research on immigrant religion in Europe based on adult samples identified a common pattern: compared to non-migrants, immigrants are more often affiliated with a religion and many are affiliated to a religion that is not historically rooted in the destination country, in particular Islam (Voas & Fleischmann 2012). Moreover, immigrants in European societies are found to have higher levels of religiosity in general than natives (van Tubergen & Sindradottir 2011). Some scholars have predicted that the elevated levels of religiosity among first-generation immigrants in Europe would decline with increasing length of stay and across immigrant generations based on general assimilation processes. The assimilation approach in migration studies posits that over time immigrants will become more similar to the majority population of their host societies (Park 1950; Gordon 1964; Alba & Nee 1997). In the religious contexts of immigrant reception in the North-Western European countries we described, this would imply an adaptation to the pattern of secularisation. This should be evident through a trend of intergenerational decline in religiosity.

However, the expectation of secularisation among immigrants has been contrasted with the alternative scenarios of religious stability and religious revival. Religious stability can be argued from the segmented assimilation perspective (e.g. Zhou 1997), which posits that different dimensions of assimilation need not co-occur. More specifically, assimilation in the economic domain could be accompanied by the maintenance of immigrant cultures, including religion, across generations. As parental religiosity is among the most important predictors of individuals’ religiosity (e.g. Myers 1996), and given the large contrast in religiosity between the first generation and the native majority, we would also expect relatively high levels of dissimilarity between majority and minority youth in the second generation based on this perspective.

Finally, arguments for a religious revival—implying increasing religiosity over time and across generations—can be derived from the perspective of ‘reactive ethnicity’ and the religious market approach. ‘Reactive ethnicity’ implies the strengthening of immigrant identities in response to negative experiences in the host society, including low socioeconomic status (SES) and discrimination (Portes & Rumbaut 2001); this notion has been extended to and empirically confirmed in the religious realm (e.g. Fleischmann et al. 2011). The theory of religious markets (e.g. Finke & Stark 1998) posits that individuals will be more religious in contexts that offer a broader range of supply of religious goods. Therefore, the increasing religious diversity that comes with international

migration would increase competition on the religious market and thus contribute to increasing religiosity.

10.3 Studying Religion and Religiosity with CILS4EU

In light of these contextual settings and competing theoretical perspectives regarding intergenerational change, we now study religion among youth with the help of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) data (Kalter et al. 2016). More specifically, we start by describing how religious minority and majority youth are in Sweden, Netherlands, Germany and England.² To answer this question, we study four aspects of religion, namely affiliation, prayer, attending religious services and the subjective importance of religion, and we compare majority and minority youth on these indicators. Subsequently, we relate the religiosity of youth—mainly focusing, for reasons of readability, on subjective importance—to possible determinants of individual differences in religiosity. Specifically, in Section 10.3.2 we will look at differences in religiosity by immigrant generation and country of origin, and we will relate the religiosity of youth to that of their parents. In a fourth step, we examine gender differences in religiosity. Previous research has revealed a gender gap in religious participation among Christian and Muslim populations, with women being more active than men in the case of Christians (Walter & Davie 1998) and an opposite gap for Muslims in terms of service attendance (Meuleman & Billiet 2011). Accordingly, we will be focusing on religious practices as well as religious salience in this particular section (10.3.3). In the last empirical section (10.3.4), to explore more of the individual differences in religiosity we focus on education, a commonly studied predictor of religiosity. Within secularisation theory, the role of a scientific worldview takes a prominent place, and suggests a negative relationship between individuals' level of education and their level of religiosity (Berger 1967). Thus, we relate religiosity to the level of education followed by youth by focusing on Germany and the Netherlands with their tracked educational systems.

10.3.1 Do minority and majority youth differ in their religion?

First, we investigate religious affiliation, which we present separately for the four countries and for majority versus minority youth in Table 10.1.³ In England

² In accordance with Chapter 3, 'minority' students are those with at least one foreign-born parent, i.e. children of immigrants in a literal sense.

³ For completeness, this and all subsequent tables also show the share of majority and minority youth that are affiliated with other religions than Christianity and Islam. As Table 10.1 makes clear, this concerns a very small group among both majority and minority youth. Point estimates such as the ones presented in this chapter will therefore be much less robust for members of these other religious groups, which is why we do not comment on them in the text.

Table 10.1. Religious affiliation by survey country and majority/minority

		Survey country			
		England	Germany	Netherlands	Sweden
Majority	Muslim	0.36	0.20	0.16	0.07
	Christian	42.17	80.13	40.82	57.77
	Other religion	1.80	0.54	1.23	1.48
	Non-religious	55.66	19.14	57.79	40.67
	No. of obs.	2,461	2,590	2,977	2,702
Minority	Muslim	23.55	30.92	27.40	27.91
	Christian	37.64	54.04	33.95	41.09
	Other religion	12.09	3.77	7.22	4.85
	Non-religious	26.72	11.27	31.43	26.15
	No. of obs.	1,533	2,304	1,340	2,048

Note: Design-weighted values; numbers of observations are displayed unweighted.

and the Netherlands most majority youth, over 55% in each of the two countries, are not affiliated with any religion. In Sweden and Germany, most majority students (58% and 80%) identify as Christians. Compared to majority youth, the share of non-religious and Christians among minority youth is lower in all four countries. Only 11% of minority youth are not affiliated with any religion in Germany, while the corresponding percentages are higher in the other three countries, reaching to over 30% in the Netherlands. The religious affiliation with most members among minority youth is Christians in all four countries. They constitute at least 34% (in the Netherlands) and up to 54% (in Germany) of the minority youth. Clearly, then, Islam is not the most prominent religion among minority youth; nevertheless, this religious affiliation is the most prominent difference among majority and minority youth. While the share of Muslims and other religious groups jointly does not account for over 3% of the majority youth population in any of the countries, almost one fourth of minority youth in all countries are affiliated with Islam. Despite the differences in the ethnic make-up of the minority population between the four countries, there are only small country differences in this share, which ranges from 24% in England to 31% in Germany.

To assess individual differences in *religiosity*, we examine: (1) the frequency of prayer; (2) religious service attendance; and (3) the subjective importance of religion. These measures correspond to religious practices and religious identity and thus capture two of the most important and most widely studied dimensions of religiosity (Voas 2007).⁴ We contrast those who pray daily with those who pray

⁴ Note that our chapter does not address religious beliefs. While considered a core element of religiosity in addition to religious practices and identity (Voas 2007), religious beliefs are more difficult to study in comparative research that includes multiple religious groups, as the content of the beliefs that are important to believers will differ across affiliations.

less frequently, and we compare youth who pay weekly visits to the church or mosque to those who attend less often. Regarding the subjective importance of religion ('religious identity'), we use the answer to the question 'How important is religion to you?' and contrast those who answered 'fairly important' and 'very important' to those who answered 'not very important' or 'not important at all'. Results are shown in Table 10.2.

We observe that, regardless of religious affiliation, daily prayer (a) is significantly less prevalent among majority adolescents compared to minority youth. The percentage of majority youth who pray daily are 10 and 8 in the Netherlands and Germany, respectively, 4% in England and 1.4% in Sweden. The share of minority youth praying daily is lowest in Sweden again, with 11%, and largest in the Netherlands, with 26%. The frequency of prayer of minority youth differs substantially across affiliations. Specifically, with rates of daily prayer between 22% (in Sweden) and 54.5% (in England), Muslim minorities take the lead in praying in all countries except the Netherlands, where the 41% of Christian minorities who report they pray daily surpass the 36% of Muslims who state the same.

Similar to daily prayers, weekly visits to religious meeting places (b) are found to be more widespread among minority than majority youth. The share of majority youth who attend services weekly is below 8% in all countries, falling down to as low as 3% in the Netherlands. However, among minority youth over 10% attend religious services weekly in all countries, and this share reaches 26% in England. This country has the largest share of highly religious minority youth in terms of attendance: 32% of Christians and 44% of Muslims in England visit religious meeting places once a week or more. In Germany and the Netherlands, the respective percentages are much lower, but in both countries Muslims more often attend religious services than Christian minority youth. The opposite is true in Sweden, however, where Muslims have the lowest rates of weekly attendance at 12%, which is only slightly higher than the 9% among affiliated majority youth and even lower than the 17% among Christian minority youth.

The two indicators of religious practices that we study—prayer and service attendance—thus show important differences between majority and minority youth, between countries and religious affiliations. Likewise we observe these differences when we ask youth about their religious identity: for majority members, the subjective importance of religion is much lower than for minority members. In Germany, 28% of the majority youth state that religion is (very) important to them; in England this is 24%. The corresponding percentages are lower in the Netherlands (16%) and Sweden (14%). When it comes to minority members, at least 49% (Sweden) and up to 60% (England) of youth indicate high levels of religious salience. Regarding differences along the lines of religious affiliation, we observe that large proportions of Christian minority youth score highly on religious salience and these shares are consistently higher than majority youth in the same country. Nonetheless, Muslims stand out most clearly on this indicator as religion is indisputably most salient among Muslims in all countries. Over 90%

Table 10.2. Religiosity of majority and minority students by survey country according to different indicators**a) Daily prayer (%)**

		Survey country			
		England	Germany	Netherlands	Sweden
Majority	Religious	8.72	8.64	20.39	2.29
	Non-religious	0.17	2.95	2.04	0.11
	All	3.97	7.57	9.72	1.40
No. of obs.		2,413	2,535	2,954	2,607
Minority	Muslim	54.46	29.86	35.66	22.28
	Christian	23.25	12.62	40.55	9.61
	Other religion	22.38	14.14	30.44	8.01
	Non-religious	0.49	0.57	0.06	0.87
	All	24.30	16.53	25.77	10.70
No. of obs.		1,481	2,234	1,326	1,924

b) Weekly service attendance (%)

		Survey country			
		England	Germany	Netherlands	Sweden
Majority	Religious	14.44	6.47	6.97	8.82
	Non-religious	1.67	1.31	0.09	2.67
	All	7.33	5.50	2.99	6.32
No. of obs.		2,408	2,542	2,954	2,605
Minority	Muslim	43.63	31.54	22.06	12.16
	Christian	31.89	13.19	17.90	16.62
	Other religion	27.97	10.25	8.42	13.71
	Non-religious	3.20	1.30	0.03	0.98
	All	26.44	17.38	12.76	11.12
No. of obs.		1,479	2,240	1,331	1,927

c) Religious salience ('very important' and 'fairly important') (%)

		Survey country			
		England	Germany	Netherlands	Sweden
Majority	Religious	47.31	32.84	31.24	20.96
	Non-religious	5.50	6.06	5.34	2.63
	All	24.17	27.82	16.28	13.57
No. of obs.		2,400	2,539	2,932	2,593
Minority	Muslim	93.42	91.61	94.15	85.66
	Christian	69.08	49.50	67.80	48.65
	Other religion	73.92	67.92	54.88	63.63
	Non-religious	9.58	3.39	8.77	7.05
	All	59.72	58.27	55.63	48.67
No. of obs.		1,487	2,251	1,321	1,926

Note: Design-weighted values; numbers of observations are displayed unweighted.

of Muslim adolescents in England, Germany and the Netherlands describe their religion as (very) important, and the corresponding percentage is only marginally lower in Sweden at 86%.

In summary, common patterns in all four countries can be observed: minority youth more often identify themselves as being affiliated to a religion than majority youth; minorities pray more often, they more often attend religious service meetings and religion is more important to them than it is for majority youth.

In terms of country differences, the patterns are less straightforward. Muslims are least religious in Sweden and most religious in England, with Germany and the Netherlands in-between. In terms of weekly service attendance and subjective importance of religion, majority youth and Christian minority youth are most active in England and least active in Sweden. When it comes to daily prayers, on the other hand, majority and Christian minority youth are most religious in the Netherlands. Considering that the share of the affiliated youth, both among the minority and the majority, is the smallest in England and the Netherlands in our data, those who are affiliated in those countries are also the most devoted in terms of religious practices. In contrast, in Sweden and more so in Germany, the higher rates of religious affiliation do not translate into active religious practice among the affiliated. In both countries, even though over 50% of youth state that they are affiliated with a religion, in practice only a small minority are engaged with religious rituals. These country differences echo the findings from the general population based on the European Social Survey, which gives us confidence that the patterns we identified are not idiosyncratic to the CILS4EU data.

So far, we have not taken into account the ethnic background of minority youth, which also could be correlated with religion. To have a better understanding of these explanatory factors for the religiosity of youth across countries, we also conducted multivariate analyses using the full scale of religious salience as dependent variable. Country-specific findings are presented in the Appendix (Tables A10.1–A10.4). These analyses show that the extent to which youth report religion to be important in their lives differs mainly across religious affiliations, with Muslims scoring highest in all four countries.

In Germany, ethnic group differences in religious salience disappear when religious affiliation is taken into account. In England, only Caribbeans and sub-Saharan Africans show significant differences in the full multivariate model. In the Netherlands and Sweden, however, more differences between youth from different origin countries persist even after religious affiliation is taken into account. Strikingly, the origin groups that still show significant differences are all from Muslim-majority countries such as Turkey, Kosovo, Iraq and the Middle East region. This suggests that on top of generally heightened levels of religious salience among Muslim youth compared to non-Muslim youth, youngsters from these countries report religion to be even more important in their lives.

10.3.2 Religion across immigrant generations

In this section, we compare the religiosity of majority and minority youth across generations. We focus our investigation on religious salience only. The CILS4EU data allow us to compare the religiosity of youth to that of their parents in terms of religious salience,⁵ but not to other indicators of religiosity. We first relate religious salience of youth to migrant generation, distinguishing between youth without a (strong) migration background and minority youth who are first generation (foreign born), second generation, children of transnational marriages and children of mixed marriages in Figure 10.1 (see Chapter 3 for the logic behind this generational classification). In the next step, we move from migrant generations to generational change within one family and compare parent–child dyads in their levels of religious salience.

10.3.2.1 Comparisons across generational status

We have already seen that majority youth have lower levels of religious salience than minority youth. Figure 10.1 further splits up this finding among the minorities and shows that religious salience is highest among second-generation immigrant youth. Remarkably, foreign-born youth are consistently less religious in terms of salience in all four countries than the pure second generation. This comparison across migrant generations therefore points in the direction of intergenerational increase, rather than decrease, in religiosity. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions on intergenerational change based on the comparison in Figure 10.1, as foreign-born youth might have arrived in the host country at a very young age and thus be largely similar to the ‘second generation’ in terms of exposure to the secularised contexts of reception. Moreover, these findings may also mirror changes in the composition of religious groups between different immigrant generations. For example, religious groups with higher religiosity such as Muslims may be less prevalent among recent migrants compared to the more established second generation.

Thus, we further test the effect of migrant generation on religious salience by controlling for religious affiliation; our findings from these multivariate analyses (see Tables A10.1 to A10.4 in the Appendix) show that when we compare the foreign born to the second generation, we do not find any significant differences in religious salience. When comparing to the majority youth, we find that in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, even after controlling for affiliation (as well as ethnicity and gender), both foreign-born and second-generation youth are more religious than youth with no strong migration background. In terms of secularising forces, one would expect that children of intermarried couples

⁵ One parent of each participant in CILS4EU was requested to also complete a written questionnaire, and this included the same question on religious salience that was answered by the child.




Figure 10.1 Religious salience ('very important' and 'fairly important') by survey country and generational status

Note: Design weighted; N=17,512.

(e.g. Turkish–German) are less religious compared to children who have two minority parents (e.g. Turkish–Turkish), and indeed this is what our findings suggest.

10.3.2.2 Comparisons across parent–child dyads

To get a better understanding of intergenerational change in religiosity, we examine how the subjective importance of religion of youth relates to the importance that their parents attach to religion in their lives, as reported in parental questionnaires. Table 10.3 shows that while there is substantial intergenerational stability in terms of subjective religious importance, there are also considerable rates of change. Where change occurs, a decrease in religious salience from parents to children is more common. Yet there are also substantial shares of youth who report a higher importance of religion in their lives than their parents do.

When we further unpack this general trend, we observe that over 50% of majority youth have deviated from their parents' level of subjective religious importance and this deviation is largely in the direction of lower subjective religious importance. At least 35% of majority youth in the four countries indicated less subjective importance than their parents, and only around 15% more, the remainder showing intergenerational stability. Among Christian minority youth, we observe that 40% or more have lower levels of religiosity than their parents.

Table 10.3. Intergenerational change in religious salience between parents and children, by religious affiliation (%)

Survey country		Intergenerational change in religious salience				
		Decrease	Stability	Increase	Correlation	
England	<i>Majority</i>					
	Religious*	50.09	38.17	11.74	0.37	
	Non-religious	22.71	50.27	27.02	-0.03	
	All	42.48	41.53	15.98	0.39	
	No. of obs.	452	437	175		
	<i>Minority</i>					
	Muslim	14.06	80.87	5.07	0.56	
	Christian	48.08	41.81	10.10	0.60	
	Other religion	49.47	41.15	9.38	-0.17	
	Non-religious	33.87	36.90	29.23	-0.10	
	All	40.47	46.77	12.49	0.62	
	No. of obs	140	237	64		
	Germany	<i>Majority</i>				
		Religious	43.55	41.03	15.42	0.31
Non-religious		24.93	51.93	23.14	0.12	
All		39.74	43.26	17.00	0.38	
No. of obs.		784	912	370		
<i>Minority</i>						
Muslim		22.74	59.61	17.65	0.34	
Christian		50.16	38.17	11.67	0.42	
Other religion		56.49	35.08	8.44	0.45	
Non-religious		25.08	44.82	30.10	-0.00	
All		38.85	45.50	15.65	0.51	
No. of obs.		534	820	308		
Netherlands		<i>Majority</i>				
		Religious	52.30	38.23	9.47	0.30
	Non-religious	34.09	46.00	19.91	0.03	
	All	46.27	40.80	12.92	0.33	
	No. of obs.	1,087	1,049	301		
	<i>Minority</i>					
	Muslim	27.09	55.93	16.98	0.13	
	Christian	42.36	45.88	11.76	0.57	
	Other religion	41.39	48.43	10.18	0.29	
	Non-religious	34.49	35.95	29.56	0.11	
	All	38.02	45.16	16.82	0.59	
	No. of obs.	261	328	120		

Table 10.3. (Continued)

Survey country		Intergenerational change in religious salience			
		Decrease	Stability	Increase	Correlation
Sweden	<i>Majority</i>				
	Religious	42.60	42.89	14.52	0.37
	Non-religious	18.68	57.87	23.45	0.18
	All	34.84	47.75	17.41	0.36
	No. of obs.	583	840	351	
	<i>Minority</i>				
	Muslim	22.29	54.42	23.28	0.50
	Christian	40.37	40.20	19.43	0.49
	Other religion	44.34	30.05	25.61	0.05
	All	30.77	44.35	24.89	0.52
No. of obs.	256	436	254		

Note: Design-weighted values; numbers of observations are displayed unweighted;

* Religious affiliation stated by parents.

The rate of intergenerational decline in subjective religiosity is much smaller among Muslim youth. Around 17% of Muslim youth in the Netherlands, 18% in Germany and 23% in Sweden indicate that religion is more important to them than to their parents. In England, the corresponding share is lower at 5%, but at the same time the proportion of Muslim youth who report less religious salience than their parents is only 14% while approximately 80% state the same level of religiosity as their parents. This high level of stability notwithstanding, the trend goes in the direction of decrease rather than increase in England, just as in Germany and the Netherlands. Only in Sweden is the share of Muslims who have lower levels of subjective religiosity compared to their parents roughly the same as the share of Muslim youth who show intergenerational increase in religious salience.

Although Table 10.3 makes it clear that there is no perfect association between parental religious salience and the religious salience of their children, the considerable stability suggests that the association between the two is positive. Indeed, bivariate correlations are in the range of $r = 0.4$ to $r = 0.5$, which implies moderately strong associations (results not shown). When parental religious salience is entered in the multivariate analysis of youth's religious salience, we find, in line with previous research on the importance of religious socialisation (e.g. Myers 1996), that this is a positive predictor in all countries (see Models 3 in Tables A10.1 to A10.4 in the Appendix). The association is among the few to survive in the multivariate regressions even after controls for origin group, generation, gender, affiliation and parental SES are taken into account. In fact, parental religious salience is the only predictor on top of religious affiliation that is highly

significant in all countries regardless of model specifications. This attests to the central role of parental religiosity in shaping the religiosity of youth in Europe.⁶

10.3.3 Gender and Religion

This section examines gender differences in religious affiliation and religious practice. While we do not expect any differences in religious affiliation, the participation in religious practices is likely to differ between girls and boys. Among adult and mainly Christian populations, women have repeatedly been found to be more religiously active than men (e.g. Thompson 1991; Walter & Davie 1998). This finding stands in contrast with Muslim communities where service attendance is substantially lower among women than among men (Meuleman & Billiet 2011), although some studies suggest that this gender gap in religious participation of Muslims may diminish in the context of migration (Predelli 2008).

Looking at the CILS4EU data, we observe that having no religious affiliation is more predominant among boys than girls (results not shown). This is true for both majority and minority youth and in all four survey countries, except for minorities in Germany where a gender gap in affiliation is absent. Moreover, in all four countries the percentage of majority girls praying daily is slightly higher than that of boys. A similar gender gap in praying is observed among Christian minority youth. However, for Muslims the difference is in the opposite direction as the percentage of Muslim girls praying daily is somewhat lower than the percentage of Muslim boys. Except for England where almost an equal proportion of majority girls and boys indicated high levels religious salience, religion is distinctly more salient among girls than boys in all countries, and most specifically in Germany. This is also the case for Christian minority girls and boys in England, Germany and Sweden, whereas the opposite holds true in the Netherlands. This gender difference in religious salience also remains significant in the three countries in multivariate analyses (see Tables A10.1 to A10.4 in the Appendix).

It is with regard to service attendance that most outspoken gender differences are expected, particularly among Muslims, based on previous research among adults. Among the majority youth and Christian minorities, we observe barely any gender gaps in service attendance (see Figure 10.2). For Muslim minority youth, however, the difference is quite sharp and consistent across all countries. The share of girls visiting religious meeting places weekly or more is evidently smaller than the share of Muslim boys. Interestingly, although the overall percentage of Muslim minority youth visiting religious meeting places weekly is higher than the corresponding share among Christian minority youth, the proportion of

⁶ However, note that due to a lower response in parental over youth questionnaires, the number of valid cases in the multivariate models drops substantially in all countries once we enter parental characteristics (see Tables A10.1–A10.4 for information about the N in each model). Comparisons between models with and without parental characteristics must therefore be conducted with great care as they are based on different samples.




Figure 10.2 Weekly service attendance by survey country, majority/minority and gender
 Note: Design weighted; N=17,475.

Muslim girls paying weekly visits is lower than among Christian minority girls in England, the Netherlands and Sweden and also than majority religious girls in Sweden. The frequency of religious practices of Muslim girls is more similar to Christian minorities and even religious majority youth in the four countries. Therefore, the higher levels of religious practices that we found among Muslim youth are accounted for, by a substantial amount, by the elevated religiosity of Muslim boys. Overall, however, gender gaps in religiosity are minor compared to the differences we observed in Section 10.3.1 between majority and minority youth and between different affiliations.

10.3.4 Religion and education

In the final empirical section of this chapter, we relate the religious salience of majority and minority youth to their level of education. Education is among the most widely studied predictors of individual religiosity and a prominent explanation for long-term trends of secularisation. The declining rates of church membership and church attendance have been linked to processes of modernisation and educational expansion (e.g. Wilson 1982). One variant of secularisation theory in the sociology of religion focuses on the notion of scientific worldview (Berger 1967). This notion holds that scientific explanations of natural phenomena increasingly render religious accounts for existential questions less important, and therefore the higher educated—who are more knowledgeable about scientific phenomena and more used to applying the scientific method of doubting and searching for empirical evidence—are likely to be less religious.

Throughout this volume we study adolescents whose eventual educational attainment is not yet known. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the relation between education and religiosity in our data. However, the tracked educational systems in Germany and the Netherlands provide an opportunity to study this association, assuming that youth attending more academically oriented educational tracks will have more of a scientific worldview than those attending more vocationally oriented tracks.⁷ Table 10.4 therefore shows the share of majority and minority youth, by religious affiliation, who report high levels of religious salience as a function of the educational track they are currently attending. In Germany, we differentiate between lower secondary tracks ('Hauptschule'; note that this category also includes special needs education), intermediary tracks ('Realschule'), upper secondary tracks ('Gymnasium') and comprehensive schools (this category includes schools offering multiple tracks and Rudolf Steiner schools). In the Netherlands, we differentiate between more applied and more theoretical tracks at the lower secondary level (vmbo-b/k v. vmbo-g/t, respectively), the intermediate (havo) and upper secondary level (vwo, including international schools).

The findings show an interesting contrast between majority and minority students in Germany. Among German majority youth we observe that religious salience is highest among students in the upper secondary track and lowest at the lower secondary level. Among minority youth in Germany, however, the opposite trend is visible: the share of students with high religious salience is highest at the lower secondary level and decreases systematically in the intermediate and upper secondary tracks. However, this pattern does not hold for Muslim youth, as the share of Muslim youth with high religious salience is more or less the same in each school track.

In the Netherlands, majority youth show a pattern of higher religious salience in higher tracks, namely intermediary and upper secondary tracks. With respect to minority youth, we find that students in the applied tracks at the lower secondary level have higher levels of religious salience than those in the more academically oriented variants. However, there is no clear decreasing trend for religious salience among minority youth across the higher tracks, as the share of youth with high religious salience is lower in the intermediate tracks than those in the upper secondary tracks.

The pattern of increasing religiosity with higher tracks among German majority youth and decreasing religiosity with higher tracks among Christian minorities in Germany already suggests that there is no straightforward, universal link between higher education and lower religiosity among youth. The results from multivariate analyses (not shown) provide further support for this interpretation.

⁷ We also examined self-reported school performance, which is available for youth in all countries. However, unlike the distribution across tracks, self-reported performance does not differ between majority and minority students and therefore cannot illuminate the majority–minority gap in religiosity that we find.

In Germany, educational track is no longer significant when origin country, generation, gender, affiliation and parental characteristics, that is, religiosity and socioeconomic background, are included. In the Netherlands, we find the same pattern observed among majority youth in Table 10.4, as religious salience is significantly higher in higher tracks in the multivariate models. This suggests that the patterns we observe among the largest share of youth in Table 10.4 are robust and not due to composition effects shaped by the selectivity of different school types in terms of the ethnicity, generational status and parental religiosity of the students they attract.

Table 10.4. Religious salience ('very important' and 'fairly important') by majority/minority and educational tracks

Survey country		Educational tracks				
		Lower secondary	Intermediary secondary	Upper secondary	Comprehensive	
Germany	<i>Majority</i>	Religious	28.28	30.33	40.97	25.49
		Non-religious	3.76	13.90	8.85	3.88
		All	24.95	29.31	36.44	16.50
		No. of obs.	597	750	625	567
	<i>Minority</i>	Muslim	91.59	89.02	91.81	95.51
		Christian	53.14	46.44	47.85	52.95
		Other religion	80.24	24.99	87.49	74.18
		Non-religious	5.67	3.10	2.71	3.66
		All	68.59	55.39	50.21	59.44
		No. of obs.	916	555	351	429
		vmbo-b/k	vmbo-g/t	havo	vwo/es/ib	
Netherlands	<i>Majority</i>	Religious	27.80	25.59	47.24	40.91
		Non-religious	2.36	5.76	6.23	7.34
		All	13.35	15.50	20.38	17.70
		No. of obs.	642	1,059	628	603
	<i>Minority</i>	Muslim	94.80	91.25	96.50	96.69
		Christian	77.28	65.33	85.23	51.89
		Other religion	86.44	24.20	78.23	87.79
		Non-religious	9.31	6.80	7.82	10.88
		All	65.66	54.65	59.11	43.96
		No. of obs.	494	394	240	193

Note: Design-weighted values; numbers of observations are displayed unweighted.

10.4 Conclusion

Because religion has moved to the centre of scholarly and societal debates about the integration of immigrants and their children, this chapter examined religion among majority and minority youth growing up in Europe today. The answer to our first research question—how many youth are affiliated to a religion, and if so, which one?—is that minority youth on average are more often affiliated than majority youth, in line with previous findings among adult samples (van Tubergen & Sindradottir 2011). Contrary to what the emphasis on Islam in European debates about immigrant religion would suggest (cf. Alba 2005; Foner & Alba 2008), however, Christianity is a more common religious affiliation among minority youth, and only between a fourth and a third of the minority youth in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden self-identify as Muslims. However, Muslim youth were revealed to be the most religious on all accounts and therefore clearly stand out from youth with other affiliations. They were found to engage in daily prayer and attend weekly religious services much more frequently than Christian minority youth, who in turn practise more than religious majority youth. These high levels of religious practice among Muslims were particularly strong among boys, with Muslim girls showing lower levels of involvement in religious practices in terms of mosque visits. This suggests that the gender difference in religious practice that is typical in Muslim communities is not reversing among youth growing up in Europe, but rather that religiosity is most persistent among male members of the Muslim community, in line with earlier research (Diehl & Koenig 2009).

Our findings about systematic differences in the levels of religious practice across religious groups, and among Muslims between boys and girls, need to be appreciated in the light of overall low levels of religiosity among the adolescents that we studied. The majority of youth do not engage in daily prayer or attend weekly services. Yet this does not mean that religion has ceased to be important in their lives. Considerable shares of youth, also in the majority population, reported that religion is fairly or very important for them. Furthermore, with regard to religious salience, Muslim youth were found to stand out as an overwhelming majority in all four countries indicating high or very high levels of importance of religion. This finding is in line with earlier research among adult Muslim minorities who have repeatedly scored extremely highly on measures of religious identification, including the importance of religion to the self (Verkuyten 2007).

Combining this finding of very high levels of religious importance, particularly among Muslim youth, with the moderate levels of religious participation that we observed, this overview of the religiosity of youth in Europe suggests that at this life stage for many youth attachment to religion is quite symbolic and does not translate into strict observance of religious rituals. It might be that some youth intend to and eventually will practise more when they become older, but it is equally conceivable that the subjective importance of religion—as the

identity component of religiosity—is the longest-lasting element where underlying religious practices point in the direction of religious decline and differences between religious groups have become merely symbolic (Gans 1994). With the notable exception of Muslim minorities, the religion of youth in Europe can best be described as a form of ‘fuzzy fidelity’ (Voas 2009), where religion continues to have meaning as an identity marker without strong implications for individual behaviour. Sociologists of religion have linked both symbolic religion and fuzzy fidelity to further religious decline, and the expectation would therefore be that, particularly among majority and Christian minority youth, the rates of religious practice and ultimately also religious identification would further diminish in the future.

This expectation of religious decline is further supported by our comparison of the religious salience of youth with that of their parents. In all groups, including Muslim minorities, and most countries, the changes were in the direction of religious decline rather than increase, though we also found quite a lot of stability (cf. Jacob & Kalter 2013; de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014). However, we should be careful of drawing strong conclusions about a clear trend towards secularisation based on these findings. For one, the comparison of parent–child dyads and the age of the youth samples under study imply that we are comparing individuals at very different stages of their life cycle. It is possible that religiosity increases over the life course, particularly at crucial events such as marriage and childbirth (Stolzenberg et al. 1995). Thus, the youth who now report lower levels of religiosity than their parents may step up their religious practice as well as salience by the time they reach the age their parents were when completing the questionnaire. On the other hand, however, one study on adolescent and adult Muslim minorities, aged 15 to 45 in the Netherlands, suggested a decline of religious practices with increasing age (van de Pol & van Tubergen 2014), which is in line with other research on the increasing risk of losing faith later in life among Christians in the Netherlands (Need & de Graaf 1996). At the same time, our intergenerational comparison also revealed that a share of youth—both among the majority and the minority—are more devoted to religion than their parents (cf. Maliepaard & Alba 2015). Among Muslims in Sweden this share was actually just as large as the share that showed intergenerational decline. This is particularly interesting in light of the finding that, on all other accounts, Muslims in Sweden are the least religious compared to Muslims in the other three survey countries. Together, these findings suggest that despite overall low levels of religious practice and a pattern of intergenerational decline rather than increase among majority and minority youth, Christians and Muslims, religion still has significance in the daily lives of youth growing up in Europe today. To what extent religion also matters for other outcomes of youth, such as their family values, interethnic ties and attitudes, is addressed in other chapters of this book.

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Appendix

Table A10.1. Multivariate analysis (OLS regression) of religious salience: England

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Origin groups (ref.: majority and North, West, South Eur.)			
Eastern Europe	0.149 (0.243)	0.075 (0.192)	0.339 (0.337)
Caribbean	0.444*** (0.159)	0.476*** (0.145)	0.563** (0.225)
Middle East & North Africa	–0.053 (0.208)	–0.305 (0.187)	–0.290 (0.246)
Pakistan	1.319*** (0.147)	0.447*** (0.148)	0.170 (0.167)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.888*** (0.175)	0.636*** (0.155)	0.620** (0.238)
Asia	–0.213 (0.174)	–0.027 (0.129)	–0.167 (0.201)

Table A10.1. (Continued)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
India	0.656*** (0.211)	0.307* (0.174)	0.084 (0.196)
Other	-0.016 (0.235)	0.113 (0.169)	0.330* (0.200)
Generational status (ref.: majority)			
Born abroad	0.416* (0.179)	0.090 (0.141)	-0.041 (0.187)
2nd generation	0.826*** (0.148)	0.229 (0.139)	0.082 (0.148)
Child of transnational marriage	0.480** (0.174)	0.066 (0.165)	0.214 (0.146)
Child of intermarriage	0.063 (0.127)	-0.068 (0.121)	-0.121 (0.155)
Gender (ref.: male)			
Female	0.158** (0.047)	0.049 (0.039)	-0.005 (0.059)
Religious affiliation (ref.: non-religious)			
Muslim		1.864*** (0.091)	1.616*** (0.190)
Christian		1.068*** (0.046)	0.826*** (0.077)
Other religion		1.394*** (0.102)	1.121*** (0.290)
Highest parental occ. (ISEI)/10			0.028* (0.014)
Parental religious salience			0.221*** (0.045)
% non-religious peers in school/10			-0.017 (0.020)
Intercept	0.826*** (0.041)	0.394*** (0.029)	0.171 (0.148)
No. of obs.	3,879	3,879	1,467
R ²	0.207	0.477	0.430

Note: Design weighted, accounting for clustering; standard errors in parentheses;

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Religious salience ranges from 0 (not at all important) to 3 (very important).

Table A10.2. Multivariate analysis (OLS regression) of religious salience: Germany

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Origin groups (ref.: majority and North, West, South Eur.)			
Italy	0.246 (0.146)	0.210 (0.143)	0.019 (0.127)
Eastern Europe	-0.092 (0.205)	-0.126 (0.196)	-0.251 (0.220)
Poland	-0.033 (0.125)	-0.031 (0.123)	-0.078 (0.139)
Russia	-0.223 (0.147)	-0.197 (0.146)	-0.109 (0.135)
Serbia	0.500** (0.178)	0.027 (0.184)	-0.121 (0.219)
Middle East & North Africa	0.420* (0.183)	0.132 (0.187)	-0.012 (0.176)
Turkey	0.834*** (0.122)	0.294* (0.148)	0.003 (0.148)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.473** (0.158)	0.313* (0.143)	0.240 (0.156)
Asia	-0.230 (0.209)	-0.164 (0.208)	-0.081 (0.242)
Other	-0.064 (0.180)	-0.101 (0.175)	0.000 (0.186)
Generational status (ref.: majority)			
Born abroad	0.404** (0.134)	0.349** (0.119)	0.173 (0.126)
2nd generation	0.581*** (0.114)	0.383*** (0.107)	0.217 (0.121)
Child of transnational marriage	0.220 (0.133)	0.070 (0.122)	0.141 (0.120)
Child of intermarriage	0.051 (0.116)	0.061 (0.112)	0.007 (0.114)
Gender (ref.: male)			
Female	0.241*** (0.047)	0.207*** (0.046)	0.185*** (0.041)
Religious affiliation (ref.: non-religious)			
Muslim		1.582*** (0.109)	1.431*** (0.114)
Christian		0.839*** (0.055)	0.595*** (0.076)
Other religion		1.219*** (0.164)	1.084*** (0.224)
Highest parental occ. (ISEI)/10			0.012 (0.009)
Parental religious salience			0.289*** (0.025)

Table A10.2. (Continued)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
% non-religious peers in school/10			0.011 (0.011)
Intercept	0.957*** (0.039)	0.288*** (0.043)	0.023 (0.093)
No. of obs.	4,790	4,790	3,628
R ²	0.188	0.324	0.358

Note: Design weighted, accounting for clustering; standard errors in parentheses;

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; religious salience ranges from 0 (not at all important) to 3 (very important)

Table A10.3. Multivariate analysis (OLS regression) of religious salience: Netherlands

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Origin groups (ref.: majority and North, West, South Eur.)			
Eastern Europe	0.245 (0.256)	0.067 (0.230)	0.175 (0.203)
Caribbean	0.263 (0.221)	0.148 (0.207)	-0.062 (0.219)
Suriname	0.234 (0.159)	0.009 (0.175)	-0.038 (0.231)
Middle East & North Africa	1.008*** (0.159)	0.736*** (0.208)	0.865*** (0.208)
Morocco	1.067*** (0.146)	0.756*** (0.207)	0.502 (0.256)
Turkey	1.078*** (0.119)	0.741*** (0.190)	0.646** (0.204)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.892*** (0.182)	0.717*** (0.161)	0.555** (0.204)
Asia	0.132 (0.177)	0.161 (0.155)	0.166 (0.178)
Other	0.104 (0.257)	-0.080 (0.219)	-0.040 (0.247)
Generational status (ref.: majority)			
Born abroad	0.673*** (0.133)	0.545*** (0.126)	0.319* (0.130)
2nd generation	0.757*** (0.127)	0.659*** (0.139)	0.597** (0.207)
Child of transnational marriage	-0.007 (0.163)	0.082 (0.164)	0.120 (0.159)
Child of intermarriage	0.013 (0.097)	0.074 (0.094)	0.059 (0.091)

(Continued)

Table A10.3. (Continued)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Gender (ref.: male)			
Female	0.186** (0.068)	0.146* (0.058)	0.125* (0.062)
Religious affiliation (ref.: non-religious)			
Muslim		0.713*** (0.177)	0.651*** (0.188)
Christian		0.652*** (0.064)	0.581*** (0.060)
Other religion		0.660** (0.211)	0.534* (0.255)
Highest parental occ. (ISEI)/10			0.016 (0.014)
Parental religious salience			0.195*** (0.035)
% non-religious peers in school/10			0.016 (0.010)
Intercept	0.742*** (0.047)	0.485*** (0.047)	0.105 (0.118)
No. of obs.	4,250	4,250	3,099
R ²	0.265	0.4397	0.374

Note: Design weighted, accounting for clustering; standard errors in parentheses;

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; religious salience ranges from 0 (not at all important) to 3 (very important)

Table A10.4. Multivariate analysis (OLS regression) of religious salience: Sweden

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Origin groups (ref.: majority and North, West, South Eur.)			
Finland	-0.009 (0.141)	-0.013 (0.133)	-0.148 (0.148)
Eastern Europe	0.268* (0.132)	0.186 (0.112)	0.191 (0.140)
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.711*** (0.165)	0.310* (0.134)	0.340 (0.183)
Kosovo	0.967*** (0.138)	0.428*** (0.124)	0.429* (0.196)
Middle East & North Africa	0.906*** (0.137)	0.572*** (0.118)	0.409** (0.153)
Iraq	1.110*** (0.141)	0.710*** (0.124)	0.485** (0.160)
Turkey	1.214*** (0.157)	0.830*** (0.162)	0.690*** (0.189)

Table A10.4. (Continued)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.890*** (0.163)	0.649*** (0.141)	0.596** (0.204)
Somalia	1.588*** (0.124)	1.001*** (0.113)	0.653** (0.203)
Asia	0.011 (0.119)	-0.142 (0.102)	-0.062 (0.148)
Other	0.098 (0.137)	0.093 (0.121)	0.045 (0.169)
Generational status (ref.: majority)			
Born abroad	0.558*** (0.115)	0.434*** (0.099)	0.286* (0.129)
2nd generation	0.606*** (0.126)	0.464*** (0.109)	0.296* (0.131)
Child of transnational marriage	0.456*** (0.121)	0.376*** (0.104)	0.469*** (0.132)
Child of intermarriage	0.004 (0.096)	0.097 (0.086)	0.132 (0.111)
Gender (ref.: male)			
Female	0.110*** (0.031)	0.067* (0.030)	0.088** (0.033)
Religious affiliation (ref.: non-religious)			
Muslim		1.174*** (0.082)	0.826*** (0.102)
Christian		0.704 (0.032)	0.538 (0.041)
Other religion		1.194 (0.116)	1.075 (0.154)
Highest parental occ. (ISEI)/10			-0.015 (0.009)
Parental religious salience			0.272 (0.019)
% non-religious peers in school/10			-0.031 (0.012)
Intercept	0.574 (0.027)	0.168 (0.022)	0.238 (0.073)
No. of obs.	4,519	4,519	2,670
R ²	0.274	0.411	0.412

Note: Design weighted, accounting for clustering; standard errors in parentheses;

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; religious salience ranges from 0 (not at all important) to 3 (very important)